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Abstract 
In recent times Japan and India are moving closer in the 
area of security. The rise of China, US strategic 
withdrawal from the Indian Ocean and Japan‟s increasing 
profile in the Asia-pacific region have contributed 
towards Japan‟s strong security partnership with India. In 
this regard this article analyses the three following 
questions: (1) What are the security activities that Japan 
has undertaken? (2) Why has Japan tried to share more 
security burden? (3) What can Japan-India cooperation 
do? Currently, Japan has enhanced its security 
cooperation with other US allies and friendly countries 
including Southeast Asian countries taking the US-China 
power balance into consideration. The changing security 
situation has pushed Japan to reconsider its security 
priorities. There is much scope for Japan and India to 
cooperate by using the linkage of East China Sea and 
Indo-China Border, share the burden of maritime security 
in the Indian Ocean region and collaborate to support 
countries around China in the South China Sea.  
Keywords: Japan-India Security cooperation, US-China power 
balance, Indo-Pacific region 
                                                          









India and Japan are coming closer in recent times, especially in the 
security domain. Japan‟s stand on the recent Doklam incident 
between India and China, is a good example. In mid-2017, the 
armed forces of India and Bhutan faced China‟s incursion at 
Doklam in Bhutan. It was during the same time that Japan-India-
US had started their joint maritime exercise Malabar 2017 (on 6 July 
2017) in the Indian waters. In this exercise, the largest warship of 
Japan, Izumo joined the exercises in the Indian Ocean. It is the first 
time that Japan has chosen to dispatch such a huge helicopter 
carrier to the Indian Ocean.  
In a similar way, Indian Foreign Secretary Dr S Jaishankar said that 
“as a country that shares similar values and principles, Japan is 
comfortable partnering India as it assumes greater security 
responsibilities. We also see the enhanced synergy between India 
and Japan on connectivity and maritime security” in Singapore on 
11 July (MEA, 2017a). In addition, Japanese ambassador to India 
Kenji Hiramatsu conveyed Japan‟s support to India and Bhutan by 
using the word “all parties involved should not resort to unilateral 
attempts to change the status quo by force” which is overtly critical 
of  the Chinese  attempt to “change  the status quo” on 18 August 
2017 (Roy, 2017). These examples show that the security ties 
between Japan and India are quite remarkable. In this regard, this 
article seeks to answer the following questions: Why has Japan 
sought security cooperation with India? What are the security 
activities that Japan has done? Why has Japan tried to share more 
security burden? What can Japan-India cooperation do for ensuring 
peace in the Indo-Pacific? 
Japan’s security perception in the Indo-Pacific 
With the ever increasing challenge from China, Japan is enhancing 
its security cooperation with the US and its allies as well as friendly 
countries. Australia, UK, and France have long been the allies of the 
US. Japan cooperates actively with these countries by sharing 
information, holding joint exercises, and by jointly developing and 
producing defense equipment. For example, during Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe‟s visit to Australia in January 2017, Japan and Australia 
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signed a new Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, which 
will facilitate mutual logistical support including materials and 
ammunition for joint exercises, UN Peace Keeping Operations, etc. 
Japan is planning to export P-1 indigenous patrol planes to New 
Zealand, too ((MOFA, 2017). From 2014, Japan has been seeking a 
Joint New Air to Air Missile development project with UK (Thai 
Military, 2017). On October 2016, for the first time, Japan and UK 
held joint air combat exercises. Japan and France are also in 
negotiations to start joint arms development project. 
Secondly, Japan is building the capacity of its defense forces in 
Southeast Asia. For instance, when a Malaysian airplane was lost in 
2014, coastal countries could not contribute to the search of the 
plane because they had insufficient radar systems to detect it. To 
resolve that situation, they needed radar and sensor systems that 
they can deploy to be aware of events such as this and to address it 
by dispatching planes and ships. During Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe‟s visit to Vietnam in January, Japan decided to donate 
six newly built patrol vessels (Panda, 2017). Japan has donated 
patrol vessels to Vietnam, Philippine, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Japan is also planning to donate used P-3C patrol planes to 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka. Export of radar to Thailand is 
also in the planning, too. Donating and exporting equipment are 
effective methods to promote long-term relations because the 
recipients need training and maintenance of suppliers. 
There are two things that have driven Japan to help the Southeast 
Asian countries in this regard; Firstly, the changing security 
situation in the Asia-pacific region has pushed Japan to do so. A 
salient feature of the recent security situation is the changing 
contours of US–China military balance. For example, during 2000-
2016, the US commissioned 14 new submarines. During the same 
period, China commissioned at least 43 submarines. Although it is 
expected that the US would prevail in case of a war, it is also true 
that US military influence has been declining gradually. Taking this 
into consideration, Japan is independently pushing for a strategic 
space in the Asia-Pacific security architecture. 
It is very evident that from the second term of Barack Obama 
administration to the new Trump administration, the relative 
influence of US military power has continued to decline. Despite 




US failure to deter Russian actions in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria, it 
is expected that President Donald Trump‟s government will seek 
cooperation with Russia. From the perspective of countries such as 
Ukraine and Moldova, which rely on the US, there is an increasing 
feeling that the US will abandon them in the near future. This sense 
of a change in the diplomatic equation has nudged Moldova 
towards negotiations with Russia. 
As a result of this unstable US foreign policy in the recent times, 
allies and friendly countries of the US in the Indo-Pacific region 
also view the future with anxiety. The US has not dissuaded China 
from building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Allies and 
friendly countries of the US, including the Philippines and 
Vietnam, are concerned about the possibility that the US might 
strike some deal with China and abandon allies and friends‟ 
concern of China‟s increasing assertiveness. Philippines has already 
slightly changed their stance under the new president Rodrigo 
Duterte. Under his government, the Philippines has not taken a 
strong position in the case of development of artificial islands in the 
South China Sea. Although US President Trump promises to 
increase the number of warships and fighter jets to “make America 
great again,” the influence of the US as a security provider has been 
declining. US allies and friendly countries now require a new 
security framework to adjust to the situation. 
Since the Obama administration, a new security framework has 
emerged. For a long time, bilateral alliances led by the US, such as 
those of Japan–US, US–Australia, US–Philippines, and US-South 
Korea have maintained order in the Indo-Pacific as an “old” 
security framework resembling a “Hub and Spoke system.” In the 
system, a deep defense relation is lacking among the allies. For 
example, both Japan and Australia are US allies, but they share no 
close security relations. Under this system, the allies and friendly 
countries of the US are heavily dependent on US military power. 
US influence is declining. Therefore, the reliability of the entire 
security framework is declining. 
Consequently, a new security framework has emerged. This 
framework is a security network of numerous bilateral, trilateral, 
quadrilateral, other multilateral cooperative relationships among 
US allies and friendly countries. This cooperation includes not only 
Satoru Nagao                           The Role of Japan-India Security Cooperation 
29 
 
US-led cooperation such as Japan-US-Australia, Japan-India-US, 
and Japan-India-US-Australia, but also Japan-India-Australia and 










Fig 1 “Old” and “New” security frameworks 
Source: Satoru Nagao, “The Japan–India–Australia “Alliance” as Key Agreement in the Indo-
Pacific”, ISPSW Publication September 2015, Issue No. 375, (Berlin, The Institute for 
Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy 
(ISPSW))http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/ Publications/ Detail/?en&id=193713 
(accessed September 23 2015) 
This new security framework presents several strong points of 
marked benefit. First, because this system is not heavily dependent 
on US influence, the adverse impact of the declining US influence 
will be minimal. Secondly, because this system includes India and 
Southeast Asian countries that have rising influence, the security 
framework can maintain sufficient power for a long time. 
Furthermore, a multilateral system demands that countries adopt a 
rule-based approach. In fact, it would be in the best interest of 
every country involved that China and Russia also are allowed to 
join, only if they agree to follow the set of rules accepted by 
everyone. Therefore, the new security framework offers the 
important possibility of reducing tensions in this region.  
India-Japan Strategic Cooperation 
India-Japan Strategic cooperation is one of the main catalysts of 
enduring peace and stability in Asia. Both countries consider China 
as a long term threat. In this regard, there are three areas especially 
where Japan-India security cooperation can help maintain the 
military balance with China and support new security framework. 
“Old Alliance”: 
US and its bilateral relations
“New Alliance”：











In Indo-China border area, the military balance is changing because 
Chinese military infrastructural modernization is very fast. During 
the 2013 skirmish between the Indian and PLA Army, Chinese 
armed forces got ready within 48 hours for battle in the border area 
whereas India needed one week for preparation as there are not 
enough roads on the Indian side (Tiwary, 2013). If a similar 
situation arises, India could be in a dangerous situation of facing 
more than three times its size Chinese forces in the border area 
(Pandit, 2012).  
Along with such rapid military modernization, the area of Chinese 
military activities too has been widening. As a background to the 
Doklam incident in 2017, India recorded more than 300 incursions 
per year, since 2011. In addition, China is deploying troops in 
Pakistan administered Kashmir as well as a part of “China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor”. Thus, because of geographical location where 
they are just located at opposite sides of China, Japan-India 
cooperation can rectify their respective numerical inferiority. For 
example, if India cooperates with Japan, India will not need to deal 
with all the Chinese fighters at once because China is likely to keep 
some of their fighters in their east side against Japan and vice versa 
(Singh, 2013).  
Therefore, under the Japan-India strategic cooperation, by using 
know-how of high-end military infrastructural development, Japan 
is willing to support India‟s efforts to modernize India‟s defence in 
the Indo-China border area. Since 2014, Japan has planned to invest 
in India‟s strategic road project in the Northeast region of India. By 
using this road, the Indian army can deploy more forces and 
supply to the border area. This road building project is just a 
beginning. Because the Japanese government will ease regulations 
that restrict Japan‟s Official Development Assistance to support 
security related infrastructural projects, further substantial support 
from Japan‟s side may be expected in India‟s strategic projects like 
construction of roads, tunnels, airports and helipads of strategic 
importance. In addition, Japan may also export radar systems to 
India to strengthen air defence and air control capabilities in the 
Indo-China border area. 
India‟s rise helps lower the heavy burden of Japan and US in the 
Indian Ocean 
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Secondly, in the Indian Ocean, China has recently started to 
increase their military activities in the littoral area. China is 
concerned about their energy dependence on Sea Line of 
communications (SLOCs) from Middle East to China through the 
Strait of Malacca. Although they have tried to make an alternative 
route via Middle East-Pakistan-China and/or Middle East-
Myanmar-China etc. connecting the  Indian Ocean through a land 
route circumventing the Malacca, as a part of “One Belt One Road” 
initiative. China feels that if India or the US choke the SLOCs it 
would severely affect Chinese economic growth. In order to avoid 
such a threat, China has been expanding its military activities in the 
Indian Ocean since the middle of 2000s.  China has continuously 
deployed its naval ships in the Indian Ocean in the guise of anti-
piracy operations. At least seven deployments were recorded with 
Chinese submarines patrolling in the Indian Ocean since 2013 (The 
Indian Express, 2017). In addition, China also exports submarines 
to countries around India. Bangladesh received two submarines 
from China in 2016 and Pakistan decided to import eight Chinese 
submarines for their navy. It must also be noted that Pakistan, may 
also be willing to purchase nuclear submarines. Because Pakistan 
does not have the technology, there is again reasonable possibility 
that China will support the building of such “indigenous” nuclear 
submarines to counter India. 
The activities of these submarines indicate that the area of influence 
of China in the Indian Ocean is going to expand. The Indian Navy 
will need to have enough ships to keep a regular watch over the 
location and purpose of other countries‟ submarines, because these 
“Chinese” submarines can potentially attack India‟s nuclear 
ballistic missile submarines (INS Arihant) and SLOCs. This means 
that these submarines will, to a great deal, regulate India‟s naval 
activities.  
China‟s strategic weakness is, however, that it does not have a 
naval port in the region. Therefore, China is setting up their base in 
Djibouti. In addition, under the “String of Pearl Strategy”, China is 
investing to develop many ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan, 
Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and 
Kyaukpyu in Myanmar in the Indian Ocean. If the Chinese navy 
uses civil-purpose ports as naval supply bases, China could 




successfully tackle their weakness of not having a naval port in the 
region. Currently, China is planning to deploy two marine brigades 
to defend its base in Djibouti and Gwadar (The Indian Express, 
2017a). 
India set to play key role in the Indian Ocean 
The question that is of importance to any maritime strategist is that, 
why has China‟s assertiveness heightened in the Indian Ocean 
lately? The changing US-China military balance could have affected 
the situation. The US influence in the India Ocean region increased 
in the 1970s. The US dispatched aircraft carrier battle groups 
several times in order to respond to conflicts within the region, 
such as the third Indo-Pakistan War of 1972, the Gulf War, 
Operation Enduring Freedom after 9/11, and the Iraq War. The US 
used the island of Diego Garcia as a hub to deploy military power. 
However, because US naval power has been declining, China has 
been increasing naval activities in the Indian Ocean like in the East 
China Sea and South China Sea. Thus, we need to find an 
alternative country to fill a potential power vacuum in this region. 
There is a high possibility that, in the near future, India will be the 
most influential sea power to fill the power vacuum in the Indian 
Ocean Region. There are six reasons which Alfred Thayer Mahan 
(1890) who analysed why Britain had been a sea power, pointed 
out. He listed six core factors i.e. 1) Geographical Position, 2) 
Physical Conformation (especially, the length of coast lines), 3) 
Extent of Territory (especially the balance between the extent of 
coastal line and military defence resources), 4) Size of Population 
(for working at sea), 5) Character of the People, and 6) Character of 
the Government (Hobson, 2002). 
Taking these factors into account, first of all, India has 
advantageous “Geographical Position” because the Indian 
subcontinent is separated from the Eurasian continent by high 
mountains. This advantage has historically proven to be significant. 
There were only three empires which dominated most of the sub-
continent in Indian history: the Mauryan Empire, the Mughal 
Empire and the British Raj. The territories of these three empires 
were very similar and all their territories are based on the mountain 
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range (Figure 3). Thus, the Indian sub-continent is a kind of island. 
And India can concentrate on its naval forces only if it possesses the 












Fig 3 Influential area of empires in the sub-continent 
Source: Satoru Nagao, “The emerging India is not a threat. Why? An assessment from Japan” 
Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science, Vol. III, Jul.-Dec. 2012, pp.99-109. 
In addition, the history of Cholas indicates another geographical 
advantage for India. Representatives of the Chola Empire, which 
was located in Southern India, made an expedition to Southeast 
Asia in the 11th century. The sphere of its influence had expanded 
along the entire coastal area off the Bay of Bengal. This historical 
fact is another prominent example of India‟s geographical 
advantage. Since India is located at the northern centre of the 
Indian Ocean, it is not only able to access Southeast Asia, but also 
all sides of the Indian Ocean, including the Middle East and East 
Africa. In fact, India has “Physical Conformation” because it has 
7517 (only mainland 6100) km of coastline. And the Indian Navy is 
the only strong power as a coastal country of the Indian Ocean 
Region means that India has enough “Extent of Territory”. 
Presently, India is in the process of acquiring more than 100 
warships. And by 2030, India is planning to increase the warships 
from 139 to 212 (Subramanian, 2016). There is a possibility that 
India will possess three aircraft carrier battle groups and nine 











India has the fifth or sixth largest number of seafarers, about 55,000 
sailors employed around the world. Thus, India also satisfies the 
condition of “Number of Population” working at sea. Based on the 
history of the Chola Empire, there is also a possibility that the 
“Character of the People” in India could be sea-power oriented. 
And finally, taking these two characteristics and the “Character of 
Government” into account, the Indian government is interested in 
expanding its sea power. The 2012 “Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign 
and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century” report, 
based on the discussions of many former National Security 
Advisors of India states that “presently, Indian military power has 
a continental orientation. Emerging as a maritime power should 
thus be India‟s strategic objective” (Khilnani et al, 2013). And 
India‟s defence budget has increased the share of its navy from 
12.7% in 1990 to 15.8% in 2015 (MOD, 2016). 
Thus, according to Mahan‟s theory, India has sufficient potential to 
become a sea power and thereby an influential country in the 
Indian Ocean Region. If India has the required will and develops 
sufficient capabilities, the cooperation with India could contribute a 
lot for Japan. This is because Japan and its ally US will be able to 
release themselves from the heavy burden to safeguard security in 
the Indian Ocean and can deploy more military force in the East 
China Sea and West China Sea to maintain the military balance in 
Asia. 
Japan-India collaborate to support coastal countries in the Indian 
Ocean 
When we think about developing infrastructure in countries 
around India, Japan-India cooperation is useful there too. In the 
countries around India, China has invested heavily to build 
infrastructure and expanded their influence. If India does not 
possess enough budget and technology, China will increase their 
influence in the Indian Ocean Region and harm the „great power 
image‟ of India. For example, Sri Lanka has an important location 
safeguarding sea lines of communications in the Indian Ocean. 
Owing to this, China has been very active in the immediate area. In 
fact, China is building ports in Colombo and Hambantota. Along 
with economic support, Chinese submarines have visited Sri 
Lanka. If China supports Sri Lankan development, then little 
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motivation exists for Sri Lanka to refuse economic support from 
China.  
Thus, Japan-India cooperation is a useful method to rectify India‟s 
individual numerical inferiority. Japan and India can cooperate to develop 
Triconmalee Port to neutralize China‟s influence. If India‟s knowledge in 
South Asia and Japan‟s budget and technology could be coupled, India‟s 
influence would strengthen. Currently, Japan and India are planning to 
develop Chabahar Port in Iran. And “Asia-Africa Development Corridor” 
vision, based on India‟s goodwill and Japan‟s financial resources was 
launched in 2017 (Chaudhury, 2017). 
Japan and India can collaborate to support countries around 
South China Sea 
India‟s “act east” policy is now getting strategic support from the 
Southeast Asian countries in recent times.  In the South China Sea, 
China‟s military power is far bigger than other countries. The 
countries around South China Sea need to amalgamate their 
leadership as one integrated power and beef up their military 
power with a trustworthy partner to provide coastal countries with 
military support. In this case, Japan-India strategic cooperation will 
be useful. “With increasing Chinese assertion in the South China 
Sea since 2001, many countries like Vietnam, Philippines and 
Singapore want India‟s increased presence in the Southeast Asia 
(Jha, 2013).” And by now, India has already started to support 
armed forces in Southeast Asia as a part of “Look East Policy” and 
its updated version “Act East policy”. India has trained the crew of 
aircraft carrier of Thailand, pilots and the land crew of fighter 
airplanes in Malaysia. Further, India has agreed to train the pilots 
and provide maintenance to the fighter airplanes in the Indonesian 
Air Force. Singapore is using India‟s land and air base for their 
training. Especially, India-Vietnam security cooperation has 
developed. India is training the crew of submarine and fighter 
pilots of Vietnam, plans to export BrahMos cruise missile and 
Akash surface to air missile to Vietnam and plans to donate four 
patrol vessels to Vietnam. 
Japan has never supported armed forces in Southeast Asia, but has 
always supported in putting in place anti-piracy system, Tsunami 
warning system, cyber defence system and building infrastructure 
like air and sea ports etc. These systems are indirectly related to 




maritime security in South China Sea. In addition, under the 
current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan has also started arms 
donation to these countries. For example, Japan will donate patrol 
ships to Vietnam and the Philippines. 
Thus, if Japan and India collaborate with each other, both countries 
can support the regional countries around South China Sea more 
effectively. For example, if Japan built the airport in Vietnam and 
the Indian Air Force trained Vietnam‟s fighter pilots, Vietnam can 
get both an airport and fighter pilots. Furthermore, if accepted by 
Vietnam, both Japan and India can share the airbase for refueling 
and thus support Vietnam by showing their presence in this region. 
Hence, under the Japan-India-Vietnam cooperation, we can create a 
win-win-win situation. 
To achieve this goal, what kind of systems ought to be established? 
In January 2014, when PM Abe visited Delhi, the two prime 
ministers “welcomed the launch of a bilateral dialogue on ASEAN 
affairs.” It will be useful if such dialogue will promote a more 
practical trilateral strategic dialogue. For example, Japan-India-
Vietnam, Japan-India-Philippines, Japan-India-Singapore, Japan-
India-Indonesia, Japan-India-Malaysia etc. As a result of such 
dialogues, both Japan and India can share information, better 
identify the needs of the Southeast Asian countries and decide how 
to cooperate or support these countries. 
 Conclusion: Japan-India-Sri Lanka cooperation will be 
vitally important 
To summarize the salient points of the article, it is important for 
Japan to enhance security cooperation with other US allies and 
friendly countries including Southeast Asian countries. The reason 
is related to US-China power balance. From the second term of the 
Obama administration and into the new Trump administration, US 
influence in the Asia-Pacific region has been on the decline. The 
possibility exists that the Trump administration needs more time to 
re-establish a security policy and show its influence effectively. 
During this time, Japan will play a role of vital importance. Japan 
should allay the concerns of Asian countries supported by the US. 
Since the Obama administration, a new security framework has 
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emerged that values Japan-India cooperation and believes that it 
has an important role. To maintain military balance and support 
the new security framework, Japan and India can cooperate by 
using the linkage of East China Sea and Indo-China Border, share 
the burden in the Indian Ocean and collaborate to support 
countries around China in the South China Sea. India‟s behaviour 
is also likely to remain that of a responsible power. Collectively 
speaking then, these seem to be the reason why Japan is seeking 
more cooperation with India lately. The time has come to 
proactively further this cooperation to ensure prosperous stability 
in the whole of Indo-Pacific.  
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